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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to use the fifteenth anniversary of the accession of Portugal and 
Spain to the European Union as an opportunity to reflect on what has happened to both countries 
since 1986. It examines the integration process and how it has affected political, economic and 
social developments in Portugal and in Spain over the last fifteen years. In our view, and on bal-
ance, Spain and Portugal have benefited from accession. Since the last century, the obsession of 
Spanish and Portuguese reformists has been to make up the lost ground with modernized Europe. 
EU membership has been a critical step in this direction. The record of the past fifteen years is 
that this dream is becoming an economic reality. Despite impressive achievements, however, 
namely, since 1986, Portugal’s average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU 
average to about 74 percent, whereas Spain’s has grown to 83 percent—both Iberian countries 
still have a long way to go to reach the EU average wealth. In addition, the question of Iberian 
and/or European citizenship, and its impact on the Portuguese and Spanish, remains open. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In the not-too-distant past, an apocryphal adage claimed that Europe ended at the Pyrenees,  
the mountain range at the southwest corner of France. This saying suggested that the nations of 
the Iberian peninsular existed somewhere outside of European consciousness. As is the case with 
such adages, it was based on certain truths: for many years Portugal and Spain were undeniably 
more focused on the politics of their respective colonial empires than they were on relations with 
their European neighbours. Further, Portuguese dictator Antonio de Salazar and Spanish dictator 
Francisco Franco were not interested in developing relationships with democratic Europe in the 
postwar period. As a consequence of this pattern of historical development, these two Iberian na-
tions were indeed isolated from Europe for a long period of time. This political reality started to 
change with the democratic transitions in both countries in the 1970s. These new Iberian demo-
cratic governments were anxious to emulate the political stability and economic prosperity of 
their European neighbours. After years of difficult negotiations, Portugal and Spain both joined 
the European Union on 1 January 1986, starting a new phase of Iberian, and European, history.  
The purpose of this paper is to use the fifteenth anniversary of the accession of Portugal and 
Spain to the European Union as an opportunity to reflect on what has happened to both countries 
since 1986. Have these changes been particular or global in nature? Have these changes led us to 
reconceptualize economic relations and political citizenship in the new Iberian peninsular of the 
new Europe? If so, how? What are some of the lessons from the fifteenth anniversary of the 
accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union? We have assembled a group of leading 
scholars, policymakers, and researchers to write about these phenomena. The essays in this 
volume examine how the integration process has affected political, economic, and social develop-
ments in Portugal and in Spain over the last fifteen years. We have divided the volume into two 
parts. The first part examines political and sociological aspects of the integration process, 
whereas the second section looks at economic and social aspects. The essays compare and 
examine the integration experiences of both countries, analyze the domestic impact of European 
Union membership, and examine the role that both countries have played in the European Union. 
This introductory chapter will examine the integration process of Spain and Portugal in 
detail. Among other concerns, it asks how fifteen years of membership in the European Union has 
had an impact on economic relations and political citizenship in Spain and Portugal. What is the 
relationship between economic growth and political citizenship? Are these separate entities, or 
are they connected in fundamental ways? Is loyalty to a political unit driven by economic 
success, or by a sense of cultural identity? Does ‘Iberian citizenship’ exist? Does ‘European 
citizenship exist’? If so, how would either of these differ from Portuguese or Spanish citizenship?   3 
The issue of Iberian membership in Europe raises at least four important issues. First, it is 
important to keep in mind that the postwar construction of the European Union was first an eco-
nomic reality (in the 1950s and 1960s) then a political one (in the 1970s and 1980s), and only 
now perhaps is becoming a cultural one (since the 1990s). Second, Portuguese and Spaniards are 
only slowly identifying themselves as ‘European.’ It is far more common for them to identify 
with their nation-state of origin. Third, although the Maastricht Treaty does contain certain sta-
tutes related to the rights of European citizens, no treaty spells out European citizenship and eco-
nomic rights and guarantees. Finally, the construction of European Citizenship, arguably, faces 
some of the very same challenges inherent in Spanish citizenship relating to linguistic and ethnic 
cleavages. 
 
THE OVERALL PATTERN OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN SPAIN AND 
PORTUGAL  
Portugal and Spain are two of the oldest nation-states in Europe, and each has a strong sense 
of national unity and mission that dates back to their battle of reconquista against the North 
African Moors. It should also be noted at the outset that there have been significant tensions 
between Spain and Portugal over the centuries. The ‘Spanish question’ has always been a press-
ing issue in Portuguese foreign policy. These nations have shared a historic relationship based on 
fear and mistrust. This hostile relationship has been characterized by Spanish disdain for the Por-
tuguese, and Portuguese defiance of perceived Spanish arrogance. And yet, in recent years, there 
have been signs that some changes might be underway—both in the relations between Spain and 
Portugal, as well as their respective relationship with Europe. 
The overall pattern of Spanish and Portuguese histories has been described, crudely, as a 
graph shaped like an upside-down version of the letter ‘V.’ That is, the graph rises—bumpily at 
times, through 600 years under the Romans, 700 years under or partly under the Moors, and a 
century of empire-building—to the peak of Spanish and Portuguese power in the sixteenth cen-
tury. After that the history of each nation goes downhill until the 1970s. A vast empire was gradu-
ally lost, leaving Portugal and Spain poor and powerless. And there was much political in-
stability: Spain suffered forty-three coup d’états between 1814 and 1923, a horrendous civil war 
between 1936 and 1939, followed by thirty-six years of dictatorship under Generalísimo Franco.1 
For its part, Portugal suffered great governmental instability during the First Republic (1910–26) 
and then forty-eight years of authoritarian rule under Salazar and Caetano.  
After the 1974 ‘Revolution of the Carnations’ in Portugal and Franco’s death in 1975, the 
graph turned upward again. In Spain King Juan Carlos, Franco’s heir, oversaw the return of  4 
democracy to the country. A negotiated transition period, which has been labelled as a model for 
other countries, paved the way for the elaboration of a new Constitution, followed by the first free 
elections in almost forty years. In Portugal the democratic transition was more turbulent and in-
cluded a revolutionary period (1974–76), but it culminated, as in Spain, in the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy. These developments were followed by the progressive return of both 
Iberian countries to the international arena—where they had been relatively isolated during the 
dictatorship. The following decade also witnessed the Socialist party being elected to actual 
power in both countries (1976 in Portugal and 1982 in Spain), bringing a new aura of modernity 
to the country. The 1980s also witnessed Spain’s integration into NATO (1982). 
 
AN OVERVIEW: IBERIAN DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND EEC INTEGRATION 
 
From the strict bilateralism that characterized the relations among the European powers in 
the years after World War II, until the adoption in 1962 of a common agricultural policy, the six 
countries that were members of the European Economic Community (EEC) went through a long 
process of integration. For most of this period, Spain and Portugal were separated from this pro-
cess. Spain only joined the Organization of European Economic Commission (OEEC) in 1959. 
When the dilemma about the European Community–European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
was resolved, Spain decided to open negotiations to seek an economic arrangement in 1962. Por-
tugal followed a different path. A traditional ally of Britain, it decided to join Britain when this 
country went ahead with the formation of a European Free Trade Association in 1959.  
Spain and Portugal were marginalized from the European integration process for political 
reasons. Neither Spain nor Portugal officially participated in World War II, but leaned toward the 
Axis side. The Axis powers had helped Franco win the civil war in Spain and had supported Sala-
zar’s regime in Portugal in the 1930s. This association between the Iberian dictators and the Axis 
regimes contributed to the French and British suspicions about the character of the Iberian 
authoritarian regimes that Franco.2 
As such, a condition imposed by the European Economic Community was that only demo-
cratic states could be members. Although each nation was interested in enjoying the economic 
benefits of EC membership, that requirement had the effect of banning Spain and Portugal from 
the EU until the 1980s. After the democratic transitions in the 1970s, both Portuguese and Span-
ish democratic governments pursued feverishly integration. Several deadlines were missed, but 
after years of long and strained negotiations, Portugal and Spain were each accepted to the Euro-
                                                                                                                                                 
1‘After the Fiesta’, The Economist, 25 April–1 May 1992, p. 60.  
2Tamames (1986), p. 167  5 
pean Economic Community on 1 January 1986. After decades of relative isolation under authori-
tarian regimes, the success of processes of democratic transition in both countries finally permit-
ted full membership in the European Community. 
For Spain, Portugal, and their EEC partners, this momentous and long-awaited development 
had profound consequences. Spanish and Portuguese policymakers expected that accession would 
help consolidate the newly established democratic institutions, modernize their outdated eco-
nomic structures, and, finally, normalize relations with their European neighbours. They also 
understood membership in the EEC as a form of political maturation. It would also help align the 
politics of both countries with their European counterparts, and accelerate the Europeanization 
and democratization of their antediluvian political structures. The urgent need for these reforms 
was highlighted by the stark environment in which it took place—the 1980s. Spain and Portugal 
experienced one of the worst economic recessions in their histories, in a political context deeply 
marked (particularly in the case of Portugal) by the instability of the institutions that had been 
established during the democratic transition.  
 
Costs and Benefits of Integration  
Clearly, accession set in motion a complex and multifaceted process of adjustment. Entry to 
the EC—renamed the European Union (EU) in the 1990s—has also brought many economic ad-
vantages to both countries. Portugal and Spain have benefited extensively from EU’s ‘structural 
funds,’ which have been used to improve the physical infrastructure and capital stock of both 
countries. At the same time, Portuguese and Spanish trade with the Community has expanded 
dramatically over the past fifteen years, and foreign investment has flooded into both countries.  
One of the beneficial consequences of these developments has been a reduction in the 
economic differentials that separated each country from the European average. For instance, since 
1986 Portugal’s average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 
74 percent, and Spain’s has grown to 83 percent. The culmination of this process was the (largely 
unexpected) participation of both countries as original founders of the European Monetary Union 
in 1999. 
The process of integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of economic 
adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. European integration has had, and 
will continue to have for the foreseeable future, a profound effect on Spanish and Portuguese so-
ciety. It has had an impact on issues such as national identity, the sustainability of welfare institu-
tions, and the adjustment of political and economic structures. Under the terms of the accession 
agreement signed in 1985, both countries had to undertake significant steps to align their legis-
lation on industrial, agriculture, economic, and financial polices to that of the European Com- 6 
munity. These accession agreements also established significant transition periods to cushion the 
negative effects of integration. This process meant that both countries had to phase in tariffs and 
prices, and approve tax changes (including the establishment of a VAT) that the rest of the Com-
munity had already put in place. It also involved, in a second phase, the removal of technical bar-
riers to trade. These requirements brought significant adjustment costs to both economies.  
 
Overcoming Historical Tensions between Spain and Portugal? 
In some ways European integration has also helped bring Spain and Portugal closer together. 
Improved relations between these two countries—reminiscent of improved Franco-German ties in 
the 1950s—have been a significant outcome of the EU integration process. For centuries both 
countries have shared a peninsula, but little else. The roots of the Portuguese–Spanish animosity 
date to 1385, when Portuguese forces successfully resisted Castellan hegemony through their 
defeat of the Spanish-led invading forces at the battle of Aljubarrota. Over the past six hundred 
years, Portugal has steadfastly defended its independence. The one period of exception occurred 
between 1580 and 1640 when the Portuguese and Spanish crowns were joined in Madrid under 
the Hapsburg monarchy. Portuguese nationalists eventually rejected Spanish rule and restored 
national independence in 1640. Furthermore, at the height of their colonial power, both countries 
stepped heavily on each other’s toes in Latin America. These historical antagonisms drove the 
people from both countries apart. Consequently, the two peoples have lived with their backs 
turned to each other. The one notable exception took place in 1939, when Spain and Portugal, 
under the rule of Franco and Salazar, signed a friendship agreement known as the ‘Iberian Pact.’ 
More important, since the transition to democracy in the two countries, relations between them 
have steadily improved within the framework of the EEC (EU). Both Spain and Portugal joined 
the EEC on 1 January 1986, and both are now members of NATO.  
This hostile climate between Spain and Portugal changed for the better in the mid-1980s. For 
instance, one of the biggest immediate effects of membership in the EEC in 1986 was vastly in-
creased trade between Spain and Portugal. In only two years, Spain emerged as one of Portugal’s 
biggest suppliers, second only to West Germany. At the same time, Spain’s imports from Por-
tugal are rising faster than those from any other country. In addition, direct Spanish investment in 
Portugal and Portuguese investment in Spain have soared. These developments demonstrate the 
increasing economic integration of both countries. It is therefore worth exploring the impact of 
European integration on both countries simultaneously. Finally, both countries have played a 
significant role in the European integration process. They participated actively in the establish-
ment of the Single European Market, and in the enactment of the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties. Portugal and Spain are strong supporters of the integration process and have intervened  7 
actively in this endeavour. At a time when Latin American and Eastern European countries are on 
the threshold of major changes, with an ambitious plan to integrate the economies of the Western 
hemisphere, the lessons derived from analysis of the Spanish and Portuguese experiences should 
be instructive to scholars, students, and policymakers from Latin America and Eastern Europe 
working on expansion and integration issues. Moreover, the examination of these two cases sheds 
new light on the challenges (and opportunities) that less developed countries face when trying to 
integrate regionally or into the global economy. 
From a cultural standpoint, the effects of integration are also significant. As part of their 
democratic transitions, both countries embarked on new processes of self-discovery. They have 
attempted to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues such as culture, na-
tionality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. The process of integration into Europe has greatly in-
fluenced these developments. And what of the new European citizenship? In this regard, Juan M. 
Delgado-Moreira recently observed that 
 
During the past five years, the European Union has been trying to sponsor a coming 
of age of European Identity awareness across national borders. In doing so, EU ad-
ministration intends to square the circle of European Union as the super nation-state 
of the nation states of Europe. However prompted or justified by the political or eco-
nomic context, it is noteworthy to what extent the texts of European statutes and 
policies lack theoretical alternatives to the territorial and relatively homogeneous 
state. In order for it not to become a threat perceived by the population in identity 
terms, the apparently forthcoming idea of European citizenship needs to address the 
concerns of both traditional and new ethno-national minorities at the state level and 
underneath. In the light of a global context, the tide of Europeanization is but a par-
ticular case of the worldwide extended tension between the two increasing and op-
posing processes of globalization and particularization.3 
Delgado-Moreira’s apt observation regarding the opposing processes of globalization and 
particularization centres our considerations. At the dawn of the new millennium, it would not be 
an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese are in the process of becoming  
‘mainstream Europeans,’ and that many of the cultural differences that separated these two coun-
tries from their European counterparts have dwindled as a consequence of the integration process.  
 
                                                 
3J. Delgado-Moreira, ‘European Politics of Citizenship’, The Qualitative Report, Volume 3, Number 3, 
September 1997 (http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/delgado.html).  8 
Spain, Portugal, and the European Community: The Integration Process  
Due to American distrust of Franco, Spain was not included in the Marshall Plan. During the 
1940s and 1950s, Spain was mostly left aside and it only developed some bilateral arrangements 
with other countries. For its part, Portugal enjoyed better relations with the United States. During 
World War II, Salazar permitted the United States to build the Lajes Base in the Azores (Terceira 
Island). The United States provided military assistance to Portugal in exchange for the use of this 
base, and also included Portugal in the Marshall Plan. And yet, when the Schuman Plan was 
issued in 1950, both Portugal and Spain were left out. The plan was restricted to the democratic 
regimes in Europe. Later on, the UK and Portugal formed the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. EFTA has emerged as a 
result of the abortive free trade negotiations, part of the so-called ‘Grand-Design’ initiated by 
Britain to create a broad free trade area. The termination by France of these negotiations in 
December of 1958 led Britain to go ahead with the formation of a European Free Trade 
Association. Plans were approved in July of 1959, leading to the signing of the Stockholm Con-
vention by the seven countries. The main aim of the Convention was to eliminate trade tariffs 
among its seven members, and to develop an industrial free trade area by 1970. It did not include 
a common external tariff. Portugal, a traditional ally of Britain, became a member of EFTA in 
1960. 
 
Integration and the case of Spain. The Spanish government followed these developments very 
closely, and a commission was created in the Foreign Ministry especially devoted to them. In 
these years it seemed clear to the government that the country could not be left out of these in-
tegrationist movements, but due to the precarious economic situation of the country, the rap-
prochement was very slow. During the late 1950s, there was a controversy in Spain surrounding 
the convenience for the country of joining the Europe of the Six (EC) or the Seven (EFTA). This 
meant that Spain had to make a decision about which of those two alternatives to follow as the 
most appropriate framework for the country.  
  It soon became clear that the Treaty of Rome was better suited for Spain’s interests. Since 
Spanish’s agricultural exports were critical for the country’s economy, the fact that the EC had 
set the creation of a common agricultural policy as one of its main objectives, whereas EFTA left 
agriculture aside, convinced Spanish authorities about the benefits of the EC. Furthermore, the 
commercial volume of Spain with the EC was 50 percent higher than the one with EFTA coun-
tries. Finally, at the beginning of the 1960s, Spanish external trade was characterized by a chronic 
imbalance between a rigid export supply and an increasing import demand. A preferential trade 
agreement with the EC would offer the country the incentive of enlarging some markets that were  9 
very important for Spanish’s exports, while at the same time contributing toward the acceleration 
of a series of structural reforms needed at that time.4 
On 14 February 1962 the Spanish Foreign minister sent a letter to Walter Hallstein, President 
of the Commission of the European Community, asking for the opening of negotiations with the 
objective of examining the possible accession of Spain to the Community.5 The request, however, 
received a cool reception from the Commission, which only acknowledged the reception of the 
letter. From the outside, several organizations pressured the Community to reject the Spanish 
request. In 1962 the Confederation of European Unions sent a letter to Mr. Hallstein pressuring 
for a rebuff. Several European newspapers joined in the campaign against Spain’s request. ‘The 
EC has to say no to Spain,’ stated the Netherlands’s newspaper Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Cournat, 
‘until the spirit of democracy and liberty are present in the country.’ The Congress of the Euro-
pean Federalist Movement meeting in Lyon at that time approved a resolution in which it rejected 
the possibility of any agreement between Spain and the EC. The Socialist Group on the European 
Parliament also said no to the Spanish request. Finally, the Congress of the European movement, 
meeting in Munich on June 1962, with the participation of a Spanish delegation, approved 
another resolution in which it was stated that only democratic countries could join the European 
Community—the Spanish representatives in this Congress were later punished with jail for their 
participation.6 
During the following two years, there was no communication between Spain and the EC. 
This was the same period during which the UK received the De Gaulle veto. After these two 
years the Spanish government decided to try again and sent a new letter. On 6 June 1964 the 
Council authorized the Commission to open conversations to ‘examine the economic problems 
that the EC causes to Spain, and to look for the appropriate solutions.’ Three exploratory 
meetings took place between 1964 and 1966. As a result of these meetings, the EC Commission 
developed a report about the content of the meetings and about the possible formulas that could 
define the future relations between Spain and the Community. The Commission developed three 
proposals—association, a commercial agreement, and a preferential agreement. After several 
evaluations the Council picked the third option.  
  After eight years of negotiations, on 29 June 1970 the Spanish government reached an agree-
ment with the EC. This agreement established a preferential system with the objective of 
eliminating the barriers to the commercial exchanges between Spain and the Community. The 
                                                 
4F. Guerrero, González, and S. Burguet (1989), p. 145 
5Pou Serradell (1973), pp. 112–15. 
6Tamames (1989), p. 168.  10 
agreement lasted only for six years.7 Following Franco’s death, on 22 July 1977 the first demo-
cratic Parliament was born after the June 15 general election. A few days later, on July 28, Spain 
presented a formal membership request to the European Economic Community. 
 
Integration and the case of Portugal. In Portugal, from 1933 to 1974, the government main-
tained an isolationist foreign policy, refusing close ties with other nations, and limiting its rela-
tions to its colonies. The Portuguese dictator, António Salazar, approached international relations 
with a unique worldview called ‘lusotropicalism.’ In his view a higher power had assigned Por-
tugal the special duty of civilizing non-European populations around the world. As such, Portu-
guese colonialism was supposedly different from the other European powers. Whereas France 
and England had used their colonial empires to exploit native peoples, Salazar contended that 
Portugal had improved life in its colonies by forming new, multiracial nations around the world, 
and cited the case of Brazil as evidence for this theory. Lusotropicalism reflected Salazar’s ideas 
about Portugal’s history, culture, experience, and duty, and was a key element in his foreign poli-
cy choices. Consequently, Salazar linked Portugal’s national interest to the maintenance of the 
colonial empire, and, for the same reasons, justified his isolationist foreign policy.  
  The international environment was against continued Portuguese colonialism in the 1960s. 
The Kennedy administration tried to prohibit the use of NATO supplies in the colonial wars, and 
NATO always refused to intervene directly in those wars. The regime even had difficulties buying 
weapons and spare parts on the world market, because any company that sold to Portugal risked 
serious penalties. Further, continued Portuguese colonialism in the early 1970s resulted in 
organized economic boycotts by several international organizations, and prevented any chance of 
Portugal’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). As the regime’s ideas of 
lusotropicalism came into contact with international norms, it was clear to Salazar and his suc-
cessor, Marcello Caetano, that Portugal would remain a pariah nation as long as it kept its colo-
nies. In response to this realization, the regime rejected the international community and pursued 
an isolationist foreign policy. 
The regime’s ideas and interests were very much bound together in Salazar’s pursuit of an 
isolationist foreign policy. He had predicated the economic viability of his Estado Novo political 
regime upon the African colonies. Keeping Portugal agricultural and traditional, Salazar balanced 
his country’s national budget with the profits from lucrative minerals and other raw materials 
from the African colonies on the world market, and stockpiled gold reserves at the national bank 
                                                 
7See  P.C. Manuel (1995), Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy, 
Landover: University Press of America. 
  11 
in Lisbon. As such, for much of his rule, Salazar’s domestic political system rested upon the 
colonial empire. Since departure from Africa would have signalled the end of this arrangement, 
Salazar demanded a military victory at all costs.  
Even after Salazar’s death in 1970, the regime was irretrievably locked into his ideas and 
interests, and continued to insist upon a military victory. Junior officers, who were bearing the 
brunt of the war, demanded a negotiated settlement to the conflict, and, by extension, a redefini-
tion of Portuguese ideas and interests. Salazar’s successor, Marcelo Caetano, failed to redefine 
Portuguese foreign policy as well, although by that time the colonies were no longer an important 
economic source for the regime. 
Exasperated by the regime’s failure to respond to its requests to end the colonial wars, a 
group of rebel officers, calling itself the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), overthrew the forty-
eight-year-old Salazar/Caetano dictatorship on 25 April 1974, plunging Portuguese politics and 
foreign policy into a period of uncertainty. This military coup began a process of change in elite 
attitudes regarding foreign policy choices in Portugal. As Walter Opello has correctly observed, 
‘During the Estado Novo (New State), Portuguese foreign policy had one fundamental objective: 
the maintenance of Portugal’s colonial empire. . . . All of this suddenly changed on 25 April 
1974.’  
In Portugal three main groups adopted different ideas and held competing interests after the 
coup, which conflict impacted the development of national foreign policy. Although the MFA re-
jected the lusotropical ideas of the previous regime, key members of the new military elite did not 
find agreement on any one idea regarding Portugal’s place in the world. Some officers, such as 
Vasco Gonçalves, favoured close relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. Others, including 
Otelo de Saraiva Carvalho, advocated ties with Third World Socialist regimes, and emphasized 
ties with Cuba. A third MFA group, led by Melo Antunes, sought to fashion an independent-
minded French-style foreign policy. These men hoped to maintain traditional alliances while im-
proving ties with other countries. In addition, the reformist General Spínola, whom the MFA had 
invited to lead the government after the 25 April 1974 coup, argued in favour of the status quo. 
He did not want any dramatic changes, and thought that a federalist solution to the colonials 
would be sufficient. MFA leftists quickly defeated Spínola, however, leaving the other three 
views in contention. The pro-NATO and pro-Warsaw Pact divergence was one element of an ide-
ological battle between Socialist party head Mário Soares and Communist party head Álvaro 
Cunhal. Soares argued NATO membership was important to national security given the threat 
from the Warsaw Pact countries. Cunhal disagreed, contending that it was time for Portugal to 
distance itself from Washington and the Vietnam War, and instead adopt a progressive pro–
Warsaw Pact strategy.   12 
All of these groups encountered significant problems from their respective international cir-
cles. Those in favour of a pro-NATO foreign policy faced difficulties from the American Secre-
tary of State, Henry Kissinger, who informed President Costa Gomes and Foreign Secretary 
Mário Soares during a 1975 official trip to Washington that he did not think they could defeat the 
pro-Warsaw Pact forces. After Soares informed Kissinger that Portugal would remain in NATO, 
Kissinger referred to Soares as a Portuguese ‘Kerenski,’ bound to lose to the Communists. Those 
in favour of a pro–Warsaw Pact foreign policy also faced difficulties. They asked the Soviet 
Union for grain and meat given the possibility of winter food shortages. Soviet President Nikolai 
Podgorny announced the Soviet willingness to help, but qualified the offer, and very few supplies 
ever arrived. Those in favour of a Third World Socialist model sought to improve relations with 
Cuba and distance the country from the Warsaw Pact. This was a near impossible task, as Cuba 
could offer no independent help without the support of the Soviet Union in the mid 1970s. 
These divisive issues within the MFA military elite resulted in an extended period of ideo-
logical and political conflict. From 1974-76 there were six provisional governments, a failed 
right-wing coup attempt in March 1975, and a failed left-wing coup attempt in November of that 
year. After this complex political and military domestic game, Melo Antunes and other political 
players, including Socialist party head Mário Soares, also committed to a democratic system, and 
a balanced foreign policy managed to prevail.8 This military and ideological modality of the 
democratic transition simplified the question of foreign policy after 1976 in that it had swept both 
the pro-Salazar right-wing and pro–Warsaw Pact left-wing elements away from the political 
equation. 
Domestic politics in Portugal in the period since the adoption of the democratic Constitution 
of 1976 have been characterized by ideological and policy disagreements among the political par-
ties. The main area of broad-based elite agreement has been in the domain of foreign policy, 
which reflects shared ideas or worldviews, knowledge of international norms, and interests. The 
basis of the agreement among the key political elite, which includes the centre-left Socialist party 
(PS), the centre right Social Democratic party (PSD), and the right-wing Party of the Democratic 
Center (CDS), is founded upon their understanding of Portugal as both an Atlantic and a Euro-
pean nation. Dating from Portugal’s anti-Spain defence Treaty of Windsor with England in 1386, 
to the 1949 NATO pact with the United States, Portugal has viewed itself as an Atlantic nation 
with a worldwide role. Indeed, this Atlantic and naval role resulted in the creation of a distinct 
Portuguese history in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, as well as the expansion of the Portuguese 
language. The key elites are also open to the notion of Portugal as a European nation, and that as-
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Landover: University Press of America.   13 
pect of its identity has emerged much more clearly since 1976. Both NATO and the EEC are com-
mitted to democratic forms of government, and have encouraged democratic development in Por-
tugal since 1976. Opposed to the Salazar/Caetano period, during which a violation of interna-
tional norms led to various boycotts, the current administration is fully engaged in the world. The 
new Portuguese administration supports the long-standing American foreign policy favouring the 
development of democracy in the world.  
At least since 1986 Portuguese foreign policy has functioned within a European framework. 
Indeed, the idea of Europe has played a central role in the development and consolidation of 
Portuguese democracy. In the ideological battles of the 1974–76 period, the PS slogan of ‘a 
Europa conosco’ (Europe is with us) significantly improved the party’s appeal to the people.9 Or, 
as António Barreto has astutely noted, ‘the democratic ideal . . . was symbolized in the greater 
part by Europe. This gave a concrete, visible, rooted, palpable sense to the aspirations for free-
dom that, by themselves, demand risk. It gave territorial and geographical significance to the un-
certain horizons of democracy. It was the real substitute for past glories. It was a home, where 
there was room for one more. Besides proximity, sympathy and affinity, Europe was security.’10 
  Portugal has been a strong supporter of the 1986 Single Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
These revisions to the original Treaty of Rome have expanded the EU’s authority in economic 
and monetary matters, establishing an extensive internal European market. Lisbon decision-
makers perceive these moves to better enable Europe to assist them with their plans for develop-
ment. By the same token, Portuguese decision-makers have not been inclined to support an 
expansion of the EU. They fear that economic resources Portugal still needs will be diverted 
eastward.11 
 
 The Enlargement Process for Portugal and Spain 
After a long and winding negotiation process that lasted for almost eight years, on 1 January 1986 
Spain and Portugal joined the EU. 
 
The accession process. Portugal applied for EEC membership in March 1977, Spain in July of 
the same year. Formal negotiations to enlarge the EC began with Portugal in October 1978 and 
                                                 
9A. Barreto (1994), ‘Portugal, Europe and Democracy,’ paper delivered at the conference “Portugal and 
the European Community: Adaptation and Evolution,” Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies, 
Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, 3 November. 
10Ibid, p. 24  
11See discussion by J. Medeiros Ferreira (1994), ‘Contemporary Portuguese Foreign Policy,’ paper deliv-
ered at the conference Portugal and the European Community: Adaptation and Evolution, Department of 
Portuguese and Brazilian Studies, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, 3 November 1994, pp. 1–
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Spain in February 1979. Spain and Portugal were poor countries and, as in the case of the Central 
and Eastern European countries a decade later, these negotiations drove a wedge between rhetoric 
and reality. The prospect of Iberian membership filled many EC members with dread. Portugal, 
fully aware that EC countries feared the economic and social consequences of Spanish 
membership, sought to have its application considered separately. Consequently, the EC nego-
tiated separately with each country. In reality, however, the applications were interrelated. 
  Enlargement negotiations proved to be slow and protracted. For Portugal the most contro-
versial bargaining issues affected textiles (which represented over 40 percent of the country’s 
industrial output and 33 percent of its exports), agriculture, and migrant workers. During the ne-
gotiations Portugal and the EC signed a pre-accession agreement that revised pre-existing agree-
ments and provided for assistance to Portugal. This agreement that came into force on 1 January 
1981 sought to modernize the Portuguese economy to facilitate the country’s eventual integration 
into the EC. By that time, however, the enlargement process was the subject of political contro-
versy all over Europe, with opposition led by the French government, which was immersed in a 
close presidential campaign, and thus viewed with dread the prospect of enlargement to the 
South.  
The EC, particularly the French, had misgivings about southern enlargement that were fo-
cused more on Spain than on Portugal. Agriculture, textiles, fisheries, and the free movement of 
labour proved to be the most contentious issues throughout the negotiations. Agricultural policy 
within the EC has been the subject of historic disputes and clashes on interests. The proposed 
Spanish membership in the EC was framed within the debate of its presumed impact on EC agri-
cultural policy as well as the ongoing budgetary crisis and attempted reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. In this regard, it was estimated that Spain’s accession would increase the EC 
agricultural area by 30 percent. At the same time, France and Spain would compete directly in the 
production of fruits, olive oil, and vegetables—hence, the French misgivings. While the French 
and Italian governments wanted to protect domestic growers, the German, British, and Dutch 
governments supported Spanish accession.  
Fisheries were also a very controversial issue. Since Spain’s fishing fleet was larger than the 
entire EC fleet combined, there was also strong interest in limiting the access of the Spanish fleet 
to the Common Fisheries Policy. The French government, with presidential elections less than a 
year away, pandered to French farmers, a powerful constituency. For instance, in a 1980 speech 
to French farmer leaders in Paris, the French president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, declared that in 
view of the ongoing disputes over the British budgetary contribution, the EC should resolve that 
issue before undertaking another enlargement. This declaration provoked an outrage in both 
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Spain and Portugal. France’s opposition, however, failed to receive strong support from the other 
EC members. Britain, a historical ally of Portugal, supported Portuguese accession and the British 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, went as far to declare in 1981 that Portugal and Spain did not 
need to join simultaneously and that Portugal could join by January 1984. Despite repeated at-
tempts on the part of Portugal to decouple the accession negotiations, the fate of Spanish and Por-
tuguese negotiations became increasingly linked. Negotiations between the Iberian countries and 
the EC progressed throughout 1981 and 1982 over a wide range of less controversial issues 
including capital movement, regional policy, transport, and services. 
  François Mitterrand’s victory in the 1981 French presidential election did not change 
France’s opposition to enlargement pending an acceptable arrangement for Mediterranean agri-
culture. Despite French opposition and Iberian rhetoric, however, the fault for the lack of progress 
in the enlargement negotiations did not lie entirely with the EC. For instance, the Spanish 
government was reluctant to introduce a value-added tax, as well as to curtail subsidies and end 
protectionism. This recalcitrance prompted the European Council in 1981 to stress the need of the 
applicant countries to introduce the necessary reforms and prepare their countries for accession.  
The applicants’ applications were strengthened in the early 1980s by the formation of rela-
tively stable administrations in both countries. The overwhelming victory of the Spanish Socialist 
party, led by its young and charismatic leader Felipe González, in the 1982 general election, and 
the subsequent election in June 1983 of Mario Soares, leader of the Portuguese Socialist party, as 
Prime Minister, gave new impetus to the enlargement process. Both leaders were passionate 
Europhiles, and one of their primary political objectives was to bring their countries into the EC. 
They embarked on a series of visits to EC capitals to make the case for Iberian accession. In the 
domestic front both new leaders implemented ambitious economic agendas to modernize the 
outdated economic and social structures of their countries. In Portugal the new government soon 
reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to restructure its economy and re-
duce the country’s foreign debt. In Spain the new Socialist government left aside demand-
oriented policies and embarked on a supply-oriented restructuring stride that sought to address the 
imbalances of the Spanish economic structure. These reformist agendas illustrated both countries’ 
determination to become model member states. The new leaders also used their personal contacts 
and ideological affinity with their European counterparts to make the case for their countries’ 
accession.  
Despite progress in the negotiations, the European Council and the EC Commission concur-
red on the need for the Community to get its house in order before any Iberian expansion could 
occur. At the 1983 Council of Ministers’ summit in Stuttgart, the heads of state of the ten member 
countries outlined the general conditions for southern enlargement. This summit stressed the need  16 
to solve EC budgetary problems and reform the CAP before Spain and Portugal could join the 
Community. In addition, it linked French demands over Community policy on fruits and vege-
tables to the expansion. The budgetary crisis of the Community dated back to the 1970s and 
became a serious obstacle when Margaret Thatcher became British Prime Minister and began ex-
asperating her EC colleagues by aggressively pursuing Britain’s budgetary claims. In order to 
mollify British concerns, the European Commission in 1983 issued a Green paper on EC finances 
that proposed mechanisms to raise additional funds. The subsequent European Council summit 
that took place in Athens in December of 1983 failed to resolve the financial issues. This summit, 
however, brought into the open the issues that required resolution. This debate led to the develop-
ment of a normative framework that became a new agenda of cohesion. German leadership in 
budgetary matters, and the country’s decision to act as the ‘paymaster’ for enlargement, paved the 
way for the resolution of standing conflicts. During the 1984 winter summit of the Council of 
Ministers at Dublin, the EC Ten reached an agreement on Mediterranean agricultural production.  
The Fountainbleu summit six months later (July 1984) resolved the standing EC budgetary 
issues, set 1 January 1986, as the agreed date for Spain and Portugal entry into the EC, and called 
for an end to negotiations by 30 September 1984. This date proved too ambitious. In December 
1984 the European Council reached an agreement on fruits, fish, wine, and vegetables that was 
accepted by the Spanish government. The formation of a new European Commission in Brussels 
led by the energetic and influential Jacques Delors in January 1985 gave a final impetus to the ne-
gotiations. Delors threw himself into the negotiations and assumed personal responsibility for 
overcoming the last roadblock, namely, the Integrated Mediterranean Program (IMPs), a Greek 
demand that sought to provide EC financial assistance to Greece to compensate for enlargement. 
In the first half of 1985, the EC foreign ministers agreed on a five-year enlargement-linked pro-
gram of structural aid to farmers, and resolved the remaining problems over fisheries, the appli-
cants’ budgetary contributions, and the free movement of labour in the EC. Finally, based on a 
new Commission proposal, the European Council of Brussels approved a seven-year program of 
6.6 billion ECUs for grants and loans to assist the existing Mediterranean regions to adjust to the 
new situation created by enlargement of the EC. These agreements resolved the final obstacles for 
Southern enlargement. Spain and Portugal joined the EC on 1 January 1986.  
  
LESSONS 
Let us suggest some lessons based on information from the preceding sections. 
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Lesson One: The Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union Contains Both Global 
and Particular Elements 
The process for Portugal and Spain to join the European Union was influenced by traditional 
European nation-state rivalries, typical of international relations since the 1648 Peace of West-
phalia. The eventual decision to allow Portugal and Spain to join the European Union was replete 
with the opposing processes of particularization and globalization. It was particular in that the 
focus was on the nation-state, and global in that EU decision-makers were concerned with har-
monizing the economies of all of the member states to the worldwide process of capital devel-
opment. Within the framework of the European Community, Spain and Portugal are now better 
prepared to compete in the global market against colossi such as Japan and the United States. 
Furthermore, European integration allows them to cooperate on their research and technological 
programs. This process may represent a watershed in Iberian and European relations, and may 
provide us with a unique opportunity to reconceptualize economic relations and political citi-
zenship in Europe and Iberia in new ways. 
 
Lesson Two: Political Considerations Were the Main Motivation behind Portugal and Spain’s 
Applications to Join the European Community 
On the one hand, Portugal and Spain both wanted to strengthen their new democratic re-
gimes, and they both held the desire to end the relative isolation they had experienced during the 
authoritarian years. These were critical political factors behind their decision to join the European 
Community. On the other hand, the economic implications of European integration were also 
very profound and played an important role in their applications for membership. The expected 
static effects of the integration were mixed. Spain, for instance, was expected to gain in some 
sectors, namely, agriculture. The asymmetry of trade barriers before integration, however—with 
Spanish barriers five times higher than those of the European Community—indicated a strong 
possibility of trade creation. This was translated into a risk of difficult adjustment problems for 
many Spanish manufacturing and agricultural sectors that were not ready for competition. 
Integration would allow them to confront the international economic recession from a stronger 
position. Without EC integration both countries would have never attracted as much investment 
as they did after 1986, and there was the real possibility, given the intensity of the economic 
crisis, that they would have fallen into third world economic levels. 
 
Lesson Three: Economic Success Can Improve Political Ties. EU Integration Has Brought 
Portugal and Spain Together 
European integration has also brought Spain and Portugal together as a region. The Spanish 
and Portuguese have finally realized that joining together will make their integration into the in- 18 
ternational system more beneficial, and they will be more likely to have their regional interests 
addressed, as they really do have many common characteristics, needs, and goals. This has been 
an important outcome of the European integration process. Indeed, there have been significant 
tensions between Spain and Portugal over the centuries.  
  As we have seen, the so-called ‘Spanish question’ has always been a pressing issue in Portu-
guese foreign policy. The two countries separated when Alfonso VI of León and Castile (the 
Cid’s king) gave the country of Portugal to his son-in-law Henry of Burgundy in 1093. These na-
tions have shared a historic relationship based on fear and mistrust. This hostile relationship has 
been characterized by Spanish disdain for the Portuguese, and Portuguese defiance of perceived 
Spanish arrogance. Spain often tried (and once managed) to absorb its neighbour. Portugal de-
feated Castille at Aljubarrota in 1385 and expelled the Spanish garrisons for good in 1640. Fur-
thermore, at the height of their colonial power, both countries stepped heavily on each other’s 
toes in Latin America. These historical antagonisms drove the people from both countries apart 
from each other.  
  While Spain historically developed what José Saramago, the Portuguese Nobel laureate, has 
defined as an ‘amputation complex,’ the Portuguese people tend to blame Spain for all the bad 
things that have happened to their country. In fact, there is a popular Portuguese adage that en-
shrines these feelings: ‘De Espanha, nem bom vento, nem bom casamento’ (‘neither good winds 
nor good marriages come from Spain’).12 In Spain Salvador de Madariaga, a Spanish liberal his-
torian, defined a Portuguese as ‘a Spaniard with his back turned to Castille and his eyes on the 
Atlantic.’ Consequently, these two cultures for centuries have shared a peninsula but little else, 
and the two peoples have lived with their backs turned away from each other. And yet, in recent 
years, there have been signs that some changes might be underway—both in the relations be-
tween Spain and Portugal, as well as their respective relationship with Europe.  
  This hostile climate changed for the better in the mid-1980s. While theirs is still a chal-
lenging relationship, it is unquestionable that Spain and Portugal are drawing closer together 
through European integration. Portuguese and Spaniards appreciate each other more. There is in-
creasing awareness of a shared history including: the legacy of exploration and empire, the mani-
pulation of the great powers during the eighteenth century, the incompetence of kings and mili-
                                                 
12 ‘Neither good winds’ refers to the sandy winds that blow from Spain onto the wine country in the north 
of Portugal, hurting the crops; ‘nor good marriages’ refers to the union between the Spanish and 
Portuguese Crowns by marriage. The last King of the Aviz dynasty in Portugal, Henry I, who was also a 
Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, succeeded his nephew, the young King Sebastian (who had been 
killed in the battle of Alcazar). When Cardinal King Henry died in 1580, the throne was taken by force by 
Philip II of Spain, who claimed royal legitimacy because his Portuguese mother was the elder sister of 
Cardinal King Henry. From 1580 to 1640 the Spanish greatly profited from the wealth generated by  19 
tary strongmen of the nineteenth century, and finally, the frustration with fascist authoritarian 
rulers in the twentieth century.  
Several developments demonstrate the increasing economic integration between both coun-
tries. For instance, one of the biggest immediate effects of membership in the European Com-
munity in 1986 was vastly increased trade between Spain and Portugal. By 1990 Spain traded 
more with Portugal than with all of its Latin American trading partners, and Spanish imports from 
Portugal are rising faster than those from any other country. Direct Spanish investment in 
Portugal and Portuguese investment in Spain has soared, and Spain has emerged as the largest 
investor in Portugal. By 2000 there were more than 3,000 Spanish firms in Portugal, compared 
with fewer than 400 in 1989, and the Portuguese own more than 400 firms in Spain. It is also 
true, however, that these economic asymmetries lie at the root of some of the tensions that have 
arisen as the two countries have drawn closer. These developments demonstrate the increasing 
integration of the Iberian economies. 
Following the example of the French and Germans, relations between Portugal and Spain 
have also dramatically improved over the last fifteen years. The increased economic cooperation 
fostered by membership in the European Union has also resulted in greater cultural exchanges 
and political harmony. Large numbers of Spaniards visited the 1998 World Expo in Lisbon, and 
Portuguese dailies have taken to printing some part of their editions during Easter Week in Span-
ish for the convenience of the many Spanish who visit the country during this time. In addition, 
the success of the year 2000 initiative to promote a new and more modern image of Portugal in 
Spain, with the joint organization of a program of cultural, political, and economic activities (in-
cluding the installation of a Portuguese pavilion to host most of these events in the heart of 
Madrid) under the title: ‘Portugal: A Bet for the Future’ illustrates the dramatic transformation in 
the relationship between the countries. These developments demonstrate their increasing integra-
tion. It is therefore worth exploring the impact of European integration on both countries simul-
taneously. 
 
Lesson Four: Economic Success Drives Public Opinion 
The decision to join the European Union in both Portugal and Spain was supported by most 
of the political parties in each country. Furthermore, according to a recent Eurobarometer study 
(see Table 1), the overwhelming majority of the population understood the importance and signi-
ficance of this step and supported the decision. EC membership would increase economic growth, 
thus increasing the standards of living of the Iberian people. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Portugal’s colonies. This chapter of Iberian unity was a disaster for Portugal. It lasted until 1640 when  20 
TABLE 1 
SUPPORT FOR EU MEMBERSHIP AND EMU 
It Is a Good Thing     It Is a Bad Thing 
Portugal       5 6       4 5    
Spain                       5 3       6 1    
Source: Eurobarometer, no. 48, October–November 1998. 
 
The polls conducted by European and Iberian institutions show that the opinions and atti-
tudes of Iberian citizens toward the process of European integration are in general favourable. It 
is important to stress, however, that there is a large portion of Iberian citizens that does not have 
an opinion about this issue. In addition, CIS and Eurobarometer data show that one of the key 
factors to account for the attitude of Portuguese and Spaniards toward European integration has 
been the perception about the personal and collective benefits derived from membership. In this 
regard the CIS data show that Iberian citizens have a very utilitarian concept of the European 
Union—that is, they evaluate the consequences of membership over issues such as living costs, 
infrastructures, job opportunities, wages, and so on, and in function of this cost/benefit analysis, 
they adopt a position in favour of or against European integration. Finally, when comparing the 
attitudes of Spanish and Portuguese citizens vis-à-vis other European citizens, the former support 
the European Union more, and express more positive opinions about the benefits derived from 
membership. They also stress further the need to build a social Europe that should emerge from 
below with the support from the people, and not only an economic Europe advanced by the 
bureaucracy and the elites.13  
 
Lesson Five: EU Membership Has Altered the Iberian Role in the World 
EC membership put an end to the relative isolationism of both countries, which had been a 
key cause of the economic, cultural, and social backwardness of both Portugal and Spain. After 
years of backwardness and isolation, Spain and Portugal have become players in Europe again. 
Iberia’s place throughout history has been at the centre of Europe. After years of isolationism it 
was time to reclaim its place there. The alternative was between the past and the future, between 
hope and fear, and both countries chose the right path, as time has proven. 
 
Lesson Six: EU Membership Has Given Spain and Portugal a Better Competitive Position 
                                                                                                                                                 
Portugal reclaimed her independence. 
13See CIS: Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea. Madrid: 1999, 
pp. 131–32.  21 
   Portugal and Spain took part in the process of European integration, a development that 
would have significant economic consequences for both countries. Spain and Portugal had tradi-
tionally been countries of emigrants. In 1986 there were more than one million Portuguese and 
Spanish emigrants throughout Europe, and the entry of Portugal and Spain into the European 
Community made Spanish and Portuguese citizens European citizens, thus ending some of the 
discrimination that those emigrants had suffered in the past. Spanish and Portuguese fishermen, 
who could not fish from the Community waters, would now have access to them. It would be a 
way to avoid surpluses of Spanish agricultural goods—which reached one-third of total output 
during some years. Some of these products would be sold more easily on the European markets. 
Spain and Portugal had to speed up the reform of their productive and economic structures in or-
der to increase the productivity of their labour force, which at the time was half of the average of 
the European Community. Integration would facilitate this process and improve the competitive 
position of the country. In fact, Spain was a highly protected country by European standards. This 
was translated into a non-competitive industrial sector.  
The Oil Crisis hit Spain strongly. The unemployment level was 22 percent in 1986. Spain 
was also facing increasing competition for its main exports—clothing, textiles, and leather. Coun-
tries from the Far East were starting to produce all of these goods at a cheaper cost by exploiting 
their low wages. These countries were attracting foreign investment in sectors in which Spain and 
Portugal had been favoured traditionally. This situation convinced the Spanish and Portuguese 
leaders that their countries had to shift toward more capital-intensive industries requiring greater 
skills in the labour force but relying on standard technology (e.g. chemicals, vehicles, steel and 
metal manufacturers). Spain’s entry into the European Community would facilitate this shift. 
Spain would have access to the EC market, thus attracting investment that would create these new 
industries. Furthermore, Spain and Portugal would also receive financial assistance from the EC: 
structural funds, the European Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Agriculture 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the newly created Integrated Mediterranean Program for 
agriculture. The interdependence of the markets and economies offered no other alternative if 
Portugal and Spain wanted to become competitive in the world market. This led to the de-
velopment of economies of scale. That is, Spanish and Portuguese producers would have access 
not only to their respective national markets but also to the European one. This fact offered 
incentives for investment and for the development of economies of scale, which in turn has re-
sulted in more competitive products in the European market. Finally, no matter how impressive 
the economic results might seem, Spain and Portugal still have a long way to go in reaching the 
EC average in wealth.  
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Lesson Seven: Real Economic Convergence Is a Slow Process 
More than three years ago, on 1 January 1999, Spain and Portugal became founding mem-
bers of the European Monetary Union. At the end both countries, which as late as 1997 were con-
sidered outside candidates for joining the Euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, interest rate, debt, 
exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established in the Maastricht Treaty. This develop-
ment confirmed the nominal convergence of both countries with the rest of the European Union. 
Nominal economic convergence vis-à-vis the European average, however, has advanced at a 
faster pace than real convergence.      
For the Iberian countries to increase their living standards to the EU average, it is necessary 
that their economies grow faster than those of the other countries. This will require further liber-
alization of their labour and service markets and better utilization of their productive resources. In 
addition, convergence will also demand institutional reforms in R&D policies, in education, and 
in civil infrastructures, as well as further innovation, an increase in business capabilities, more 
investment in information technology, and better and more efficient training systems. Finally, a 
successful convergence policy will also demand a debate about the role of public investment and 
welfare programs in both countries. In the Iberian countries increases in public expenditures to 
develop their welfare states have caused imbalances in their national accounts. Both countries still 
spend significantly less in this area than their European neighbours, however (e.g., Spain spends 
6.3 points less on welfare policies than the EMU average). Effective real convergence would 
demand not only effective strategies and policies, but also a strong commitment on the part of 
Spanish and Portuguese citizens to this objective. 
Iberian integration in the European Union has allowed these economies to become integrated 
internationally and to modernize, thus securing convergence in nominal terms with Europe. In 
spite of this progress, however, Iberian economies still have to achieve convergence in real terms, 
reconciling convergence in productivity with the creation of employment. In terms of 
convergence and growth in the long run, while contributing to important progress, fifteen years 
have not been long enough. 
 
Lesson Eight: European Integration Has Not Led to Convergence in Social Expenditures 
While social expenditures have increased in both countries over the last two decades, the gap in 
social expenditures between the Iberian countries (particularly Spain) and the European Union 
has not narrowed (see Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION EXPENDITURE, % GDP, 1980–97  23 
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Source: Guillén et al. 2001:  4. Data from: Eurostat 1997 and Eurostat 2000. 
 
At the same time, it is worth noting that European Funds have helped develop social policies 
and the construction of infrastructures related to them. They have also enhanced new undertak-
ings in social policy. Without these funds the increase .in social expenditures would not have 
been sustainable. The absence of such funds for Latin American countries will significantly hin-
der efforts to develop and expand their welfare states. 
 
Lesson Nine: EU Membership Has Both Benefits and Costs 
As we indicated in the introduction, entry into the European Union has so far brought many 
advantages to both countries. Portugal and Spain have benefited extensively from the European 
Union’s cohesion policies, which have contributed to improving the physical infrastructure and 
capital stock of both countries. At the same time Portugal and Spain’s trade with the Community 
has expanded dramatically over the past fifteen years, and foreign investment has greatly in-
creased. One of the main consequences of these developments has been a reduction in the eco-
nomic differentials that separated both countries from the European average. For instance, since 
1986 Portugal’s average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 
74 percent, while Spain’s has grown to 83 percent. The culmination of this process was the 
(largely unexpected) participation of both countries as original founders of the European 
Monetary Union in 1999. 
From a social and cultural standpoint, the effects of integration are also significant. As part 
of their democratic transitions, both countries embarked on new processes of self-discovery. They 
have begun to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues such as culture, 
nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. The process of integration into Europe has greatly 
influenced these developments. At the dawn of the new millennium, it would not be an exag-
geration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese have become ‘mainstream Europeans,’ and 
that many of the cultural differences that separated these two countries from their European 
counterparts have faded as a consequence of the integration process.  24 
The process of integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of economic 
adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. European integration has had, and 
will continue to have for the foreseeable future, a profound effect on both countries’ societies. It 
has had an impact on issues such as national identity, the sustainability of welfare institutions, 
and the adjustment of political and economic structures. As discussed earlier, under the terms of 
the accession agreements signed in 1985, both countries had to undertake significant steps to 
align their legislation on industrial, agriculture, economic, and financial polices to that of the 
European Community. These accession agreements also established significant transition periods 
to cushion the negative effects of integration. This meant that both countries had to phase in 
tariffs and prices, and approve tax changes (including the establishment of a VAT) that the rest of 
the Community had already put in place. This process also involved, in a second phase, the re-
moval of technical barriers to trade. These requirements brought significant adjustment costs to 
both economies.  
The Iberian enlargement illustrates that EU integration required a set of measures including: 
increased competition, privatization of public enterprises, industrial restructuring, and deregula-
tion. These measures have translated into efficiency gains, which have been reinforced by a more 
stable macroeconomic framework. At the same time, lower inflation and fiscal consolidation have 
led to lower real (and nominal) interest rates, which, in turn, have resulted in a higher sustainable 
growth. There have also been short-term costs, however, associated with monetary integration. 
Indeed, the losses of the exchange rate and of monetary sovereignty require a process of nominal 
convergence and fiscal consolidation, as well as higher cyclical correlation, for euro membership 
to be successful. This should be taken into account for future Latin American economies. 
Argentina proves to be another example of this. The Iberian enlargement shows that prior to 
monetary integration, candidates must carry out a process of modernization and nominal conver-
gence without fixing their exchange rates. Finally, as we previously indicated, the role of Struc-
tural Funds has also been crucial. These allow for the construction of public infrastructure vital 
for private sector productivity and real convergence. 
 
Lesson Ten: Structural and Cohesion Funds Play a Key Role 
The structural funds and cohesion funds are the instruments designed by the European Union 
to develop social and cohesion policies within the European Union (see Table 2). The cohesion 
funds were established in the Maastricht Treaty in order to compensate for the efforts countries 
with the lowest per capita income (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) relative to the European 
Union would need to make to comply with the nominal convergence criteria. These funds, which 
amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, have contributed significantly to reducing re- 25 
gional disparities and fostering convergence within the European Union. At the same time, they 
have played a prominent role in developing the factors that improve the competitiveness and 
determine the potential growth of the least developed regions.14 
During 1994–99, EU aid accounted for 1.5 percent of GDP in Spain and 3.3 percent in Por-
tugal.15 EU funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively stable since the 
mid-1980s. The percentage of public investment financed by EU funds has been rising since 
1985, to reach average values of 42 percent for Portugal and 15 percent for Spain. It has been 
estimated that the impact of these funds on the ratio of public investment in the Spanish economy 
in the past few years has been 0.5 percent higher as a consequence of EU funding, which in turn 
had a positive effect on private investment and per capita income in the long run.16 [1] Moreover, 
the European Commission has estimated that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP growth 
and employment has been significant: GDP rose in 1999 by 9.9 percent in Portugal and 3.1 
percent in Spain. In the absence of these funds, economic integration in the Americas is bound to 
be far slower and unbalanced. 
 
TABLE 2 
STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS 
Greece Ireland Spain Portugal
GDP %
1989-93 2,6 2,5 0,7 3,0
1994-99 3,0 1,9 1,5 3,3
2000-06 2,8 0,6 1,3 2,9
% on Gross Fixed Capital Formation
1989-93 11,8 15,0 2,9 12,4
1994-99 14,6 9,6 6,7 14,2
2000-06 12,3 2,6 5,5 11,4  
Source: Sebastian 2001: 25. Data from: European Commission. Estimates based on Eurostat data 
and forecast for 2000–2006. 
 
                                                 
14See Sebastian (2001): ‘Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May not be Enough,’ pp. 25–26. Paper presented 
at the conference From Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the 
European Union, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2–3 November. 
15As Sebastian (2001, pp. 25–26) indicates, ‘this is set to fall slightly in the period 2000-2006, to 1.3 per-
cent of GDP. The decline reflects, on the one hand, a reduction in structural funds over the new 
programming horizon (structural funds will represent around 0.3 percent of EU GDP in 2006, compared 
with 0.45 percent in 1999) and, on the other hand, the impact of enlargement (accession aid). This fall-off 
in funding will clearly affect the long-term growth of the Iberian economies’. 
16 Sebastian, p 26.  26 
Lesson Eleven: Financial Institutional Reform Will Not Produce the Necessary Institutional 
Reforms in Other Areas 
Financial institutional reform has not forced institutional changes in other areas (i.e., the 
labour market or fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European Monetary System in 1982, 
caused in part by successive devaluations of the Iberian currencies, showed the limits of financial 
and monetary instruments to impose institutional reforms in other areas and to balance domestic 
and external economic objectives. This is a potential danger. Institutional reforms require action 
on the part of the governments that are willing to pay the short-term political price for unpopular 
policies. 
 
Lesson Twelve: The Democratic Pre-Requirement for Membership Is a Powerful Incentive for 
Democratization 
As we have seen, long-standing authoritarian regimes prevented Spain and Portugal from 
joining European organizations and kept both countries on the fringe of the integration process 
that began in Europe after World War II. The emergence of democratic regimes in both Spain and 
Portugal in the second half of the 1970s paved the way for the successful consideration of these 
countries’ applications for membership in the European Community. This was a prerequisite. As 
long as the political setting of these countries remained authoritarian, membership was not 
feasible. This was a powerful incentive for democratization and also for the consolidation of 
democratic institutions (i.e., the failure of the 1981 coup d’etat in Spain and the revolutionary at-
tempt in Portugal). Whereas other agreements (i.e., the North American Free Trade Agreement —
NAFTA) have left aside such a precondition, including it would provide a powerful incentive for 
Eastern European and Latin American countries to consolidate their democratic processes and 
avoid authoritarian temptations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
When Portugal and Spain applied to the European Community, most of the political parties 
in each country supported this decision. The overwhelming majority of the population understood 
the importance and significance of this step. After years of backwardness and isolation, Spain and 
Portugal wanted to become players in Europe again. Iberia’s place throughout history has been at 
the centre of Europe. After years of isolationism, it was time to reclaim its place there. The 
alternative was between the past and the future, between hope and fear, and both countries chose 
the right path, as time has proven. The interdependence of the markets and the economies offered 
no other alternative if Portugal and Spain wanted to become competitive in the world market.   27 
Throughout this introductory chapter, we have analyzed the main political and economic fac-
tors that motivated the accession to the European Community. We have showed that political 
considerations were the main motivation behind Portugal and Spain’s application to join the 
European Community. Their wish to strengthen the new democratic regimes, coupled with their 
desire to put an end to the relative isolation that both countries had suffered during the authori-
tarian years, were critical factors behind their desire to join the European Community. 
The economic implications of European integration were also very profound, however, and 
played an important role in Spain and Portugal’s application for membership. The expected static 
effects of the integration were mixed. In addition, the asymmetry of trade barriers before inte-
gration—with Spanish barriers five times higher than those of the European Community—in-
dicated a strong possibility of trade creation. This asymmetry was translated into a risk of diffi-
cult adjustment problems for many Iberian manufacturing and agricultural sectors that were not 
ready for competition.  
The advantages and benefits that the Iberian countries expected from their integration into the 
European Community clearly offset the disadvantages:17 
1.  EC membership contributed to the termination of secular isolationism of both countries, 
which had been one of the roots of both countries’ economic, cultural, and social back-
wardness. 
2.  Membership has allowed them to confront the international economic recessions of the 
1980s–90s from a stronger position. Without EC/EU integration both countries would 
have never attracted as much investment as they did after 1986, and there was the real 
possibility, given the intensity of the economic crises, that they would have fallen into 
third-world economic levels. 
3.  Portugal and Spain have taken part in the process of European integration. They have be-
come significant players and have been able to influence important decisions (such as the 
establishment of the cohesion funds) that have had significant consequences for both 
countries. 
4.  The EU framework has better prepared Spain and Portugal to compete in the global mar-
ket against colossi such as Japan and the United States. European integration has allowed 
both countries to cooperate and benefit from European education, research, and techno-
logical programs. 
5.  Spain and Portugal had traditionally been countries of emigrants. In 1986 there were 
more than 600,000 Spanish emigrants throughout Europe. EU membership has con-
tributed to better economic performance, which has provided better opportunities for  28 
Iberian citizens, and this helped to reverse this historical pattern. In addition, EC/EU 
membership has made Spanish and Portuguese citizens European citizens, thus ending 
some of the discrimination that those emigrants had suffered in the past. 
6.  Membership has given the Spanish and Portuguese fish, agricultural, industrial products, 
and services access to European markets.  
7.  EU membership has forced Spain and Portugal to speed up the reform of their productive 
and economic structures in order to increase the productivity of their labour force.  
8.  EU accession helped consolidate new democratic institutions. 
9.  Finally, EU membership has increased economic growth, thus improving the standard of 
living of the Iberian people. As we have seen, after Portugal and Spain joined the Com-
munity, GDP rose faster, investment soared, unemployment decreased, inflation was kept 
under control, and the deficit in the current accounts’ balance was sharply reduced. The 
Iberian governments’ actions to liberalize these economies and open their countries to the 
European Community contributed to this remarkable turnaround. As expected, much of 
the expansion was financed from abroad. The flow of foreign direct investment into 
Spain doubled over the first two years of membership and reached $80 billion in the 
period 1986–91.182 Between 1970 and 1998 foreign investment in Spain grew from 1 
percent of GDP to more than 6 percent. 
 
No matter how impressive these results might seem, Spain and Portugal still have a long way 
to go to reach the EC average wealth. For instance, as we have mentioned before, since 1986, 
Portugal’s average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 74 
percent, while Spain’s has grown to 83 percent. In Spain, unemployment currently stands at 12.5 
percent of the labour force, and is the highest in the Union. Imports have been growing faster than 
exports and the trade deficit has tripled. The competitive position of both countries is also 
worrisome. Spending on R&D is still below 1 percent of GDP—low compared with the richer EU 
countries. Spending on training and education of workers is insufficient, too. Moreover, low 
wages—which were one of the most attractive factors for investors—have risen over the last 
decade. Unit labour costs have therefore been increasing faster than those of these countries’ 
main EU competitors. Indeed, wages are still lower than in Germany, but they are roughly 
equivalent to those in Britain. Finally, labour flexibility is still hampered by rigid labour laws. 
                                                                                                                                                 
17See G. Fuentes, pp. 47–48. 
18‘After the Fiesta’, p. 3, and Hine (1989), p. 23. 
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This is not to say, however, that Spain and Portugal are worse off after the integration—as 
some claim. Economic adjustment was unavoidable and should have taken place anyway—within 
the European Union or out of it—if both countries wanted to become competitive. EC entry ac-
celerated some tough economic measures, and has aggravated some of the already existing im-
balances. Portugal and Spain’s entry into the EC/EU, however, attracted billions of dollars in 
foreign investment that helped to alleviate adjustment problems. 
The path toward ‘convergence’ has been (and will be in the foreseeable future) long and 
winding. Over the last two decades, Iberian governments have been forced to reform their pen-
sion and welfare systems, namely, by freezing health spending, cutting subsidies, and setting re-
strictions on the entitlement to unemployment pay. They also have had to privatize most public 
companies to more efficiently enforce the laws to stop unemployment fraud—which is still ram-
pant—and to cut excessive bureaucracy. All of these measures led to social problems because the 
unions did not accept these reforms easily. Some of these processes remain unfinished. 
In our view, and on balance, Spain and Portugal have benefited from accession. Since the 
last century the obsession of Spanish and Portuguese reformists has been to make up the lost 
ground with modernized Europe. EU membership has been a critical step in this direction. The 
record of the past fifteen years is that this dream is becoming an economic reality. The question 
of Iberian and/or European citizenship, and its impact on the Portuguese and Spanish, remains 
open. 
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